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This paper analyzes the consequences of cross-border mergers in a spatial framework, thereby 
distinguishing three channels of influence: a price increase due to the elimination of product 
market competition, an adjustment in plant location which reduces overall transportation cost 
expenditures, and a harmonization in production costs due to a technology transfer within the 
firm. The welfare analysis illustrates that larger countries are better off after the merger. By 
contrast, smaller countries may lose, if the pre-merger production cost differential across 
firms is negligible and/or a post-merger technology transfer across production sites is 
infeasible. Furthermore, the analysis provides novel insights into the trade pattern effects of a 
merger. In this respect, the main result of the paper is that an adjustment of plant location in 
space can reverse the direction of (net) trade flows. 
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It is now well established that cross-border mergers are the predominant form of foreign
direct investment (FDI). In particular, there is overwhelming empirical evidence that
cross-border mergers outnumber foreign greeneld investments and that their share in
overall FDI has considerably increased in recent years (UNCTAD, 2000). Despite this
empirical regularity, \the theoretical literature on cross-border mergers is tiny, both in
absolute terms and relative to the enormous literature on greeneld FDI" (Neary, 2007,
p. 1229). It is therefore not surprising that key issues with cross-border mergers are still
unexplored. To be more specic, while existing studies emphasize the role of international
trade costs and trade as well as competition policy for understanding the patterns of cross-
border mergers, an analysis of spatial aspects of mergers in a setting where countries have
a geographical dimension is missing so far.1
The debate about spatial issues in the international economics literature has focused on
trade ows. Tharakan and Thisse (2002) crafted a variant of Hotelling's (1929) line model
to consider the role of intranational transport costs and country size for rm location and
the pattern of cross-border goods trade.2 Egger and Egger (2007) have extended this
model to account for international and intranational outsourcing. A seminal contribution
1Falvey (1998), Huck and Konrad (2004), and Saggi and Yildiz (2006) study the interaction between
national policy and cross-border mergers. Horn and Persson (2001) and Bjorvatn (2004) have elaborated
on the dierential impact that changes in trade costs exhibit on the incentives for greeneld FDI and the
acquisition of existing plants. They argue that, contrary to the tari-jumping argument, cross-border
mergers may be stimulated by a decline in international trade costs. In a similar vein, Neary (2003, 2007)
shows that trade liberalization may trigger merger waves. However, in contrast to previous work he uses
a general oligopolistic equilibrium framework and thus allows for income and factor price eects. Hijzen,
G org and Manchin (2007) provide empirical support for a negative relationship between trade costs and
mergers. Aside from these policy-related determinants of foreign investment, Nocke and Yeaple (2007a,b)
have pointed to the role of rm-specic characteristics for explaining the patterns of cross-border mergers
and greeneld FDI.
2Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995) have also used the Hotelling line to study the consequences of trade
liberalization in a spatial framework. However, as pointed out by Tharakan (2001), the equilibrium
analyzed there does not exist due to the assumption of linear transport costs.
1to the literature on trade in a spatial setting is Rossi-Hansberg (2005), who considers
a continuum of regions (countries) on a line to investigate the relationship between the
spatial distribution of economic activity and the trade pattern. A shortcoming of these
and related spatial models of international trade is that they do not consider cross-border
mergers.
It is the purpose of this paper to link the literature on cross-border mergers to recent
work on trade in a spatial model  a la Hotelling. The starting point of our analysis is
the long-run free trade equilibrium in Tharakan and Thisse (2002) with two unequally
sized countries (represented by dierently sized segments of a line), quadratic transport
costs, and two rms { one located at the Western bound and the other one at the Eastern
bound of Hotelling's line, respectively. Unlike Tharakan and Thisse (2002), we allow for
dierences in the production costs of the two rms. In this setting, a (horizontal) merger
between the two rms gives rise to three sources of prot gains: (i) higher prices due
to reduced product market competition; (ii) a relocation of production sites to reduce
transport costs; and (iii) the use of the best-practice technology across production plants
rather than the locally available one. While sources (i) and (iii) have been highlighted
in the existing merger literature (see Neary, 2007, for an overview), the second source of
prot gain points to a new channel of inuence, which is strictly spatial in nature.3
A comparison of the equilibrium with independent (strategic) rm decisions and the
equilibrium with joint prot maximization under the umbrella of an integrated rm pro-
vides the following insights regarding the possible merger-induced trade and welfare ef-
fects. First, the trade pattern in our model is determined by a non-trivial interplay of
size and technology dierences. And, for certain parameter domains, a merger may lead
3It is worth noting that, by choosing a Hotelling framework, we conduct our analysis in a setting
with price competition. Signicant dierences between models of price competition and ones of quan-
tity competition with regard to possible merger gains are well understood in industrial economics. See
Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983), Deneckere and Davidson (1985) for two inuential contributions
on that matter. However, in our framework this distinction plays a minor role, since a merger induces a
monopolization of the product market with a single integrated rm serving all consumers ex post. In this
case, a merger is always protable, irrespective of the prevailing mode of product market competition.
2to a reversal of the direction of (net) trade ows. We characterize these domains and
develop a measure for the \likelihood of a trade reversal". We also discuss the relation-
ship between the likelihood of a trade reversal and the (ex ante) cost dierential between
rms.4 Second, the welfare analysis conrms the well-established result that a merger
leads to prot gains which come at the cost of a loss in consumer surplus due to market
monopolization. Overall welfare increases due to lower transport costs after an adjust-
ment in rm location and/or due to the transfer of the best-practice technology across
production sites. Furthermore, the merger-induced welfare gain rises with the pre-merger
cost dierential between the two rms. While this outcome is less surprising in the case
of a technology transfer, it also holds if a technology transfer is excluded and the two
plants dier in their production costs before and after the merger. The reason is that the
integrated rm can relocate its production sites in order to (further) increase the market
share of its low-cost plant. This points to a so far unexplored channel through which a
merger inuences welfare: adjustments of plant location in space.
Assuming that total prot income is equally distributed among consumers, we can also
derive national (regional) welfare eects. In this respect, the main nding of our analysis
is that a country tends to be worse o after the merger if it is suciently small and
production cost dierences are not too large. Again, it is the adjustment of rm location
{ and the associated increase of transport cost expenditures for consumers at the Eastern
and Western end of the Hotelling line { which is responsible for this result. Only if cost
dierences are sizable and a merger leads to a technology transfer with the best-practice
technology being used in both production facilities, a welfare increase in every country is
guaranteed, irrespective of the prevailing size dierences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the basic
4It is also worth noting that the merged rm may nd it optimal to locate a production plant in
either of the two countries and still trade the homogeneous good. Hence our spatial approach oers
an explanation for simultaneous horizontal bilateral trade and horizontal multiplant activity. Despite
its empirical support, this property is typically absent from existing models of horizontal multinational
activity (see, e.g., Markusen and Venables, 1998, 2000)
3model with free trade and two (independent) rms. The impact of a merger on plant
location, prices, welfare and trade pattern is at the agenda of Section 3. There, we
distinguish three scenarios. In the rst scenario, we assume that rms do not dier in
their production costs, in order to obtain a benchmark for the possible merger eects.
In scenario two, we consider production cost dierences but exclude the possibility of a
technology transfer. The impact of a technology transfer is addressed in scenario three.
A distinction between these three scenarios is useful because it allows us to separate
dierent channels of inuence and derive a detailed picture of the possible merger eects
in a Hotelling framework. Section 4 provides a short summary and some concluding
remarks.
2 Basic model set-up: free trade with two rms
Consider a spatial model  a la Hotelling with two producers, one operating in the West
(W) and one in the East (E). Producer ` is located at address x` on a line of length one:
x` 2 [0;1], ` = W;E. xW is the location of the Western producer: xW < xE.5 Firms may
dier in their marginal production costs, while xed rm set-up costs are identical and
normalized to zero for the sake of simplicity. Without loss of generality, we can associate
the Western rm with the technologically advanced producer and normalize its marginal
production costs to zero. The marginal production costs of the Eastern rm are denoted
by c  0.
There is a unit mass of consumers which is uniformly distributed over the unit interval.
Consumers make a binary choice of purchasing one unit of the consumption good or
nothing. They are identical with respect to their willingness to pay which we denote
by A. A consumer's address is b 2 [0;1]. The two producers set mill prices p` and
consumers have to bear the shipping costs of (b   x`)2, which are quadratic in order
to ensure existence of an equilibrium (see d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse, 1979).
Accordingly, the consumer price equals p(b;x`) = p` +(b x`)2 for a consumer at address
5In the borderline case of xW = xE, the model reduces to one with perfect price competition.
4b who purchases the good from a producer located at x`.
By maximizing utility, consumers choose the supplier who oers the lower consumer
price. To focus on the relevant aspects of the model, we impose two further assumptions.
First, the willingness to pay (A) is suciently high to ensure full coverage of consumers
in equilibrium: A > 5=4+c=2+c2=36. Second, production cost dierences are suciently
small to guarantee positive demand for each of the two producers in equilibrium: c 
6  
p
27.6 In this case, consumer demand for output of the two rms is determined by









Consumer demand for the producer with address xW is given by dW = bi, while consumer
demand for its competitor with address xE is given by dE = 1   bi. The corresponding
prots of the two producers are
W = pWbi (2)
E = (pE   c)(1   bi): (3)
Prot maximization entails two stages. The producers choose their location in the
rst stage and set prices subsequently. The maximization problem can be solved through












(xE   xW)[2   (xW + xE)]
2
; (5)
according to (1)-(3). The two reaction functions conrm the well-known result that mill
prices are strategic complements. By virtue of (4) and (5), sub-game-perfect equilibrium
















(xE   xW)[4   (xW + xE)]
3
: (7)
6See the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix for a formal derivation of these conditions.
5Substituting (6) and (7) in (1), we can express the marginal consumer's address as a
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Solving for the prot-maximizing rm locations and using superscript n to refer to
an equilibrium with independent producers (no merger), the following proposition can be
established.
Proposition 1 Consider A > 5=4 + c=2 + c2=36 and c  6  
p
27. Then, the two rms
locate at the boundaries of the unit interval (xn
W = 0, xn
E = 1), the marginal consumer
resides at address bn
i = 1=2 + c=6, prices are given by pn
W = 1 + c=3, pn
E = 1 + 2c=3, and
prots are given by n
W = (3 + c)2=18, n
E = (3   c)2=18, respectively.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 conrms the well-known result of maximum dierentiation (in rm lo-
cation) if transport costs are quadratic (see d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse, 1979).
In addition, we see that an increase of production cost parameter c not only leads to a
higher mill price of the Eastern producer, but also implies a higher mill price of the West-
ern rm, as prices are strategic complements. However, the price increase of the Eastern
rm is larger, so that the marginal consumer moves eastwards. As a consequence, the
market share of the Western rm increases, while the market share of the Eastern rm
declines.
In the following, we associate the Hotelling line with two integrated countries { thereby
abstracting from any additional costs of shipping goods across the common border. The
Western country is of length r 2 (0;1) and the Eastern one of length 1 r. In this case, the
6trade pattern depends on the location of the common border at r relative to the address
of the marginal consumer. If bn
i > r, the Western country exports the consumption good,
while the Eastern country exports, if bn
i < r. In the case of identical production costs
(c = 0), it is the smaller country that exports due to lower transport costs for serving
consumers at the common border (see Tharakan and Thisse, 2002). However, in the case
of cost asymmetries the dierential c > 0 matters as well (see Egger and Egger, 2007).
A nal element we are interested in is welfare, which, of course, depends on the prot
maximizing location and price choices of rms. To be more specic, overall (world) welfare
equals the sum of total prots n  n
W + n















E   (1   b)
2]db
= A   4=3   c=3 + (1=2   c=6)
2: (11)
Hence, overall welfare is
V
n = A   1=12   c=2 + 5c
2=36: (12)
It is intuitive that welfare declines in cost parameter c, because a higher c can be associated
with a less ecient technology in the East.
To determine national welfare levels, the ownership structure of rms is important.
For simplicity, we assume that ownership of rms (and thus total prot income n) is
equally distributed among consumers.7 Then, prot income in the Western country is
given by rn, while prot income in the Eastern country equals (1 r)n. Noting further







[A   c=3   1]r   r3=3 if r  bn
i
[A   c=3   1]r   r3=3 + (r   1=2   c=6)2 if r > bn
i
(13)
7Note that this assumption diers from the respective assumption in Tharakan and Thisse (2002),
where rm ownership is country-specic. In the context of mergers, however, our approach is more
convenient, because it does not require any further assumptions about the international distribution of
merger gains. Similar assumptions regarding rm ownership can be found in the literature on international








(A   c=3   1)(1   r) + (1=2   c=6)2   1=3 + r3=3 if r  bn
i










[A   c=3 + c2=9]r   r3=3 if r  bn
i










(A   c=3 + c2=9)(1   r) + (1=2   c=6)2   1=3 + r3=3 if r  bn
i
[A   2c=3 + c2=9 + r](1   r)   1=3 + r3=3 if r > bn
i
(16)
for the national welfare levels in W and E, respectively.
This completes our discussion of the pre-merger equilibrium. In the next section, we
investigate how a merger (and thus joint prot maximization) aects location and price
decisions. We also analyze to which extent a technology transfer and the use of the best-
practice technology in both production plants inuences these decisions. Furthermore, we
compare welfare and the trade pattern in the pre- and post-merger equilibrium.
3 A merger between the two rms
To draw a comprehensive picture of the possible merger eects, we distinguish three al-
ternative scenarios. In the rst one, we assume that c = 0 holds both before and after
the merger. This benchmark analysis allows us to investigate in detail how changes in the
location decision and the price-setting behavior of rms aect the variables of interest.
In the second scenario, we allow for technology dierences and consider asymmetric pro-
duction costs which are the same before and after the merger takes place: c > 0. In the
third scenario, we account for production cost dierences in the pre-merger case, c > 0,
and assume that the merger leads to a harmonization of production costs: c = 0. A com-
parison of the second and the third scenario highlights the consequences of a technology
transfer.
83.1 Costs are identical ex ante and ex post
If c = 0, rms do not dier in their production costs. They set identical prices (pn
W = pn
E =
1) and realize the same level of prots (n
W = n
E = 1=2) in the pre-merger equilibrium
(see Proposition 1). The two producers share the market equally (bn
i = 1=2), so that it is
the smaller country, i.e., country W if r < 1=2 and country E if r > 1=2, that exports the
consumption good. This corresponds to the case of a long-run free trade equilibrium in
Tharakan and Thisse (2001). Fig. 1 gives a graphical representation of the price-location
schedules in the pre-merger equilibrium (dashed lines).
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Figure 1: Price location schedules in the pre- and post-merger equilibrium if production
costs do not dier across rms.
A merger between the two rms leads to a monopolization of the market and, there-
fore, to higher mill prices. By maximizing joint prots, the integrated rm increases
prices until the most distant consumer that is served from a particular plant is indierent
between purchasing and not purchasing the consumption good. In addition, moving both
production sites to the interior of the market reduces transport costs and allows for a
9further increase in the mill prices. If production costs are identical, the integrated rm
will choose those locations for its two production facilities, which minimize overall trans-
port cost expenditures. Altogether, joint prot-maximization leads to plant locations
xm
W = 1=4, xm
E = 3=4 and prices pm
W = pm
E = A   1=16 (with superscript m referring to
a post-merger equilibrium variable). In this case, the marginal (most distant) consumer
resides at address bm
i = 1=2 and there is full coverage in equilibrium. The corresponding
prots are given by m = A   1=16.
Comparing prots in the post-merger equilibrium, m, with total prots in the pre-
merger situation, n = 1, we can see that a merger leads to prot gains of  
m  n = A 17=16 > 0. Aside from this positive prot eect, a merger also inuences
consumer surplus, with the respective change being given by8
CS = 17=16   A +
Z 1=2
0




= 18=16   A; (17)
which is negative if A > 5=4 + c=2 + c2=36. Hence, a merger between the two rms
exhibits two counteracting eects on overall (world) welfare. On the one hand, it raises
prot income , but on the other hand, it reduces consumer surplus CS. For given
aggregate demand, the prot gain dominates the consumer surplus loss, implying that
overall welfare increases:
V  CS +  = 1=16 > 0: (18)
This welfare increase is due to a decline in overall transport cost expenditures and equals
T  T n   T m in Fig. 1.
The increase in overall (world) welfare, however, does not mean that both countries
can equally participate in the respective gains. To determine the national welfare eects,
8The consumer surplus in the pre-merger equilibrium is given by CSn = A 13=12, according to (11),











1=16   (b   3=4)
2
i
db = 1=24. Noting CS  CSm   CSn, the second line in (17) follows immedi-
ately.





(17=16   A)r + (r=4)[r   1=4] if r 2 [0;1=2]
(24=16   A)r   r2=4   1=8 if r 2 (1=2;1]:
(19)
Noting further that prot gains in W equal W(r) = [A   17=16]r, we nd that welfare





(r=4)[r   1=4] if r 2 [0;1=2]
(7=16)r   r2=4   1=8 if r 2 (1=2;1]:
(20)
By virtue of (20), we can conclude that the Western country is worse o after the merger
if r < 1=4, while it benets from the merger if r > 1=4.9 From Fig. 1, we see that
consumers on interval [0;bW) experience a transport cost increase after the merger, as the
Western production facility moves eastwards. This group of individuals denitely loses,
while consumers on interval (bW;bE) gain, as their transport cost expenditures decline.
Hence, it is intuitive that there exists a critical country size for welfare gains from a
merger. Due to a quadratic shape of the transport cost function, this critical country size
is smaller than 1=2. If r = 1=4, total transport cost expenditures of W are the same in the
pre- and post-merger equilibrium, implying that in this particular case the merger does
not aect welfare in the Western economy. However, if r > (<)1=4 total transport costs
decline (increase) so that welfare in W is higher (lower) in the post-merger equilibrium.
Due to symmetry in the production costs, we can also conclude that the Eastern economy
is better o after the merger if r < 3=4, while it is worse o if r > 3=4.
A nal issue we need to address is the impact of a merger on the direction of trade.
From Fig. 1 we see that the merger does not inuence the position of the marginal
consumer, i.e., bn
i = bm
i = 1=2. Hence, recollecting from above that the small country
exports the consumption good in the pre-merger equilibrium, it is immediate that the
9From the rst line of (20), it is immediate that VW(r) is negative if r 2 (0;1=4), while VW(r) is
positive if r 2 (1=4;1=2]. Furthermore, dening B(r)  (7=16)r   r2=4   1=8, with B0(r) >;=;< 0 ()
7=8 >;=;< r and noting B(1=2) = 1=32 > 0, B(1) = 1=16 > 0, we can conclude that VW(r) > 0 holds
for all r 2 (1=2;1].
11direction of trade is unaected by the merger, as long as 1=4 < r < 3=4. In this case,
the Western production plant remains located in the Western country and the Eastern
production plant remains located in the Eastern country. If, however, r < 1=4 or r > 3=4,
the smaller country loses its production facility and, thus, becomes an importer of the
consumption good. In this case, a merger reverses the direction of trade.
Proposition 2 summarizes the most important results of the previous analysis.
Proposition 2 If c = 0, a merger raises prots, reduces consumer surplus and increases
overall (world) welfare. If 1=4 < r < 3=4 both countries benet from the merger and
the smaller country exports the consumption good in the pre- as well as the post-merger
equilibrium. On the contrary, if r < 1=4 (r > 3=4), welfare declines in the small Western
(Eastern) country and the direction of trade is reversed.
Proof. Analysis in the text.
While the assumption of equal production costs provides an interesting benchmark for
our analysis, it seems natural from the viewpoint of empirical facts to allow for production
cost dierences across rms. Therefore, in a next step we investigate how the results in
Proposition 2 change if c > 0.
3.2 Costs are dierent ex ante and ex post
If c > 0, the more productive Western producer sets a lower mill price, serves a larger




i > 1=2 and n
W > n
E, according to Proposition 1. In addition, there may be exports of
W even if it is the larger country. To be more specic, W exports the consumption good,
as long as r < bn
i , with bn
i > 1=2 if c > 0.
The analysis of the post-merger equilibrium becomes somewhat more complicated
than the respective analysis in Subsection 3.1. In particular, we can distinguish between
three sources of prot gains if c > 0. First, for a given location choice, the integrated
producer can increase either mill price, because p(bn
i ;0) = p(bn
i ;1) < A if A > 5=4+c=2+
c2=36. Second, by moving both production sites to the interior of the market, overall
12transport costs decline, so that mill prices can be further increased without reducing
overall consumer demand. Third, in addition to these two types of prot gains, which are
also present in the case of identical production costs, the integrated rm has an incentive
to increase the market share of its low-cost Western production facility: dW > bn
i . Two
subcases can be distinguished with respect to the size of dE, i.e., the market share of the
Eastern production facility. If the production cost disadvantage of the Eastern plant is
suciently small (0 < c < 3=4), the integrated rm will operate two production plants at
locations xW 2 (1=4;1=2) and xE = (3=4;1), respectively. In this case, we have dE > 0.
If, however, production cost dierences are sizable (3=4  c  6  
p
27), the integrated
rm shuts down the Eastern production facility and serves all consumers from the center
of the market to minimize overall transport costs: xW = 1=2. This implies dW = 1 and
dE = 0. We discuss these two subcases, separately.
Case I: 0 < c < 3=4
If the integrated rm operates two production plants, it serves consumers on interval
[0;bi], with 0 < bi < 1, from its Western production facility and consumers on interval
(bi;1] from its Eastern production facility. In this case, prot-maximization leads to plant
locations10 xW = bi=2, xE = 1=2 + bi=2, prices pW = A   b2
i=4, pE = A   (1   bi)2=4, and
joint prots  = A   c   1=4 + bi(c + 3=4)   3b2
i=4. Dierentiating the latter expression,
with respect to bi, we can conclude that bi < 1 requires c < 3=4. In this case, the
marginal consumer has address bm
i = 1=2+2c=3, the two production plants are located at
xm
W = 1=4+c=3, xm
E = 3=4+c=3, respectively, mill prices are given by pm
W = A (1=4+c=3)2,
pm
E = A (1=4 c=3)2 and joint prots equal m = A 1=16 c=2+c2=3. Fig. 2 displays
the pre-merger and the post-merger equilibrium.
The monopolization of the market in the post-merger equilibrium leads to an increase
in prot income,  = A 17=16 c=2+2c2=9 > 0, while the consumer surplus declines,
10Similar to our analysis in Subsection 3.1 we can conclude that if the integrated rm wants to serve
consumers on some interval [bl;br] through production in its Western (Eastern) plant, it is always the
best strategy to locate this plant in the center of the interval, in order to minimize transport costs.
13CS = 18=16   A + c=2 + 7c2=36 < 0 (consider A > 5=4 + c=2 + c2=36).11 Summing up,
we obtain
V = 1=16 + 5c
2=12; (21)
which is positive and strictly increasing in c.12 With a higher cost dierential, the inte-
grated producer has an incentive to increase the market share of the Western plant, by
moving both production facilities eastwards. (Formally, we have dxm
W=dc = dxm
E=dc =
1=3.) This reduces the social costs of a higher c. Since an adjustment of rm location is
not feasible in the pre-merger equilibrium, it is intuitive that a higher cost dierential c
has a positive impact on V .
With the overall welfare eects at hand, we can now turn to the national implications
of the merger. Since the formal derivation of the national welfare eects is tedious, we
have relegated it to the Appendix with the most important insights being summarized in
the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If c 2 (0;3=4), there exists a critical level  rW  [1=16+c=6 2c2=9]=(1=4+c=3),
such that VW(r) >;=;< 0 if r >;=;<  rW. Welfare in the Eastern economy denitely
11It is notable that a higher cost parameter c lowers the prot gain. On the one hand, a higher c
reduces the intensity of price competition in the pre-merger equilibrium, thereby leading to higher total
prots: dn=dc = 2c=9 > 0. On the other hand, in the post-merger equilibrium the rm chooses a price
strategy that renders the marginal consumer indierent between buying and not buying. Hence, prices
do not depend on marginal production costs (provided that these costs are not too high) and the rm
has to bear the entire burden of a c-increase. This explains dm=dc < 0. Aside from this negative eect
of a c increase on , we can identify a positive eect on CS. On the one hand, there is a negative
impact of c on CSn, because rms increase their mill prices and overall transport cost expenditures rise.
On the other hand, with prot-maximizing prices of the integrated rm being independent of production
costs, there is only an indirect eect of a c increase on CSm, due to adjustments in plant location. This
relocation eect is of second order, implying that CS increases in c.
12See the Appendix for a detailed derivation of (21). There are two sources of welfare gains from a
merger, if c 2 (0;3=4). On the one hand, bn
i > bm
i =2 implies that overall transport cost expenditures fall






14increases if c   3=8 +
p
27=8. If, however, c <  3=8 +
p
27=8, there exists a critical
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Figure 2: Price location schedules in the pre- and post-merger equilibrium if the produc-
tion cost dierential across rms is small.
For an intuition of the welfare eects in Lemma 1, it is useful to contrast these results
with the respective ndings in Subsection 3.1. In the case of identical production costs
(c = 0), the Western economy experiences a welfare loss (gain) in the form of higher (lower)
transport cost expenditures if r < (>)1=4. However, if c > 0, there are two additional
eects. On the one hand, we know from (21) that a higher c raises the positive welfare
eect of a merger, due to an adjustment in rm location: dxm
W=dc > 0, dxm
E=dc > 0. This
eect tends to lower the critical level of r. On the other hand, an increase in xm
W leads to
higher transport costs for consumers on interval [0;xm
W), which counteracts the rst eect
and tends to shift the critical level of r eastwards. If c > 3=8, it is the rst eect that
dominates, implying  rW < 1=4. In contrast, if c < 3=8 the second eect is stronger, so
15that  rW > 1=4.
Things are dierent in the Eastern economy, where 3=4 gives the critical level of r if
c = 0 (see Proposition 2). In the Eastern country, the two identied eects of an increase
in c go in the same direction. For suciently high levels of c (i.e., if c >  3=8 +
p
27=8),
this implies that the Eastern economy will always benet from a merger between the two
rms. In contrast, if c <  3=8 +
p
27=8, there exists a critical level  rE 2 (3=4;1), such
that the Eastern economy is better (worse) o after the merger, if  rE > (<)r.
A nal element to determine is the role of a merger for the trade pattern. Similar to
Subsection 3.1, we can note that r < xm
W implies that the Western country exports the
consumption good in the pre-merger equilibrium, while it loses its local production facility
and, therefore, imports the consumption good in the post-merger equilibrium. In analogy,
r > xm
E implies that the Eastern country loses its local production facility and imports
the consumption good in the post-merger equilibrium (although it was an exporter of the
consumption good in the pre-merger equilibrium). Furthermore, in contrast to Subsection
3.1, where the address of the marginal consumer was not inuenced by a merger between
the two rms, we have bn
i < bm
i if c > 0. Hence, there is a third r-domain, where a
merger reverses the direction of trade. If r 2 (bn
i ;bm
i ), the Western economy imports
the commodity in the pre-merger equilibrium, while it becomes an exporter in the post-
merger equilibrium. This result points to a non-trivial interplay of size and production
cost dierences, because the direction of trade may not only be reversed if countries dier
substantially in their size but also if the size dierence is rather small.
In a thought experiment, we can sum up the dierent ranges, in which a trade reversal
occurs, and obtain R = 1=2 + c=2 if c 2 (0;3=4). This implies that the likelihood of
a trade reversal increases with the cost dierential c, if country size is randomly drawn
from the unit interval. This completes our formal analysis of Case I with a relatively
small cost dierential c 2 (0;3=4). In a next step, we investigate Case II, in which the
cost dierential is more pronounced: c 2 [3=4;6  
p
27].
16Case II: 3=4  c  6  
p
27
If c  3=4, operating the high-cost Eastern production facility becomes unattractive for
the integrated rm.13 In this case, prots are maximized by choosing location xm
W = 1=2
and setting a mill price pm
W = A   1=4. With the Western plant serving all consumers
(dW = 1), this implies that prots equal m = A   1=4 in the post-merger equilibrium.
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Figure 3: Price location schedules in the pre- and post-merger equilibrium if the produc-
tion cost dierential across rms is sizable.
Prot gains are given by  = A   5=4   c2=9 and the consumer surplus change
CS = 5=4 A+c=2 c2=36 is negative due to our assumption about A. Summing up,
overall welfare changes can be expressed in the following way
V = c=2   5c
2=36; (22)
with the derivation details being deferred to the Appendix. Noting that c  6 
p
27, we
13Note that limc!3=4 bm
i = 1 holds under Case I.
17can conclude that a merger raises welfare, i.e., V > 0, with the respective welfare gain
being increasing in the cost dierential c.14 This conrms the respective result of Case I.
Furthermore, the national welfare eects can be summarized as follows.
Lemma 2 If c 2 [3=4;6  
p
27), there exists a critical  r1
W = 1=2   2c=3 + 2c2=9, such
that VW(r) >;=;< 0 if r >;=;<  r1
W. Welfare in the Eastern country increases, i.e.,
VE(r) > 0, for any r.
Proof. See Appendix.
The results in Lemma 2 conrm our previous insight that the Western economy is
better o after the merger if it is suciently large (r >  r1
W, with the critical country size,
 r1
W, being smaller than 1=4 if c  3=4), while the Eastern economy always benets if the
cost dierential is sizable (with c  3=4 being sucient).
A nal issue to be addressed is the impact of a merger on the trade pattern. In
Fig. 3, we see that a merger reverses the direction of trade if r < 1=2. In this case,
the smaller Western country exports in the pre-merger equilibrium, while it becomes
an importer after the merger, because the consumption good is produced in the larger
Eastern country in the post-merger equilibrium. Furthermore, if r > bn
i , country E exports
in the pre-merger equilibrium, while it imports the consumption good in the post-merger
equilibrium. Finally, the merger leaves the direction of trade unaected, if r 2 (1=2;bn
i ).
Hence, in contrast to Case I, there are only two intervals where a merger changes the
direction of trade, if c 2 [3=4;6  
p
27] renders an operation of the Eastern production
facility unattractive.
Similar to Case I, we can sum up the parameter ranges over which a merger reverses
the direction of trade and obtain R = 1   c=6. An increase in cost dierential c reduces
the likelihood of a trade reversal if country size is randomly drawn from the unit interval.
14Closing the Eastern production plant and locating the Western facility at the center of the market,
gives rise to two types of welfare gains. On the one hand, bn
i > 1=2 implies that overall transport cost
expenditures are lower in the post-merger equilibrium, due to the assumption of quadratic transport costs
(i.e., Tn > Tm in Fig. 3). On the other hand, there is a decline in overall production costs if the Western
facility serves all consumers.
18Together with the insights of Case I, this implies that the likelihood of a trade reversal
reaches a maximum at c = 3=4.
With the formal analysis of cases I and II at hand, we can now summarize the main
eects of a merger on welfare and the trade pattern.
Proposition 3 If c > 0 a merger raises prots and reduces consumer surplus. Overall
welfare goes up, with the respective gain rising in the cost dierential c. The Western
country benets only, if it is suciently large, while the Eastern country always benets,
if the cost dierential c is not too small, i.e., if c >  3=8 +
p
27=8. Otherwise (if
c <  3=8 +
p
27=8), the Eastern country may be worse o after the merger, if it is
suciently small. Regarding the trade pattern eects, we nd that the likelihood of a
trade reversal is always higher in the case of cost asymmetry (c > 0) than in the case of
identical production costs (c = 0) and that it reaches a maximum at c = 3=4.
Proof. Proposition 3 follows from the analysis above.
3.3 Costs are dierent ex ante but identical ex post
In this subsection, we address the consequences of a technology transfer.15 For this pur-
pose, we assume that production costs dier ex ante, i.e., c > 0, rendering the pre-merger
equilibrium in Subsection 3.2 the starting point of our analysis. After the merger, the
integrated rm uses the best-practice technology in both production plants, implying
that the post-merger equilibrium is the same as in Subsection 3.1. Fig. 4 depicts the
price-location schedules for the pre- as well as the post-merger scenario.
Similar to the previous two subsections, the monopolization of the market induces a
prot gain:  = A   17=16   c2=9 > 0. The consumer surplus change is given by
CS = [18=16   A + c=2   c2=36], which is negative due to our assumption about A.
15There is strong empirical support for intra-rm technology transfer within the boundaries of multi-
national enterprises. See among others Fors (1998) and Girma and G org (2007). Similar to Long and
Vousden (1995) and Ferrett (2006) we assume that techonology can be costlessly transferred between
production plants.
19Summing up, we obtain16
V = 1=16 + c=2   5c
2=36: (23)
V is positive, because a merger lowers transport cost expenditures (i.e., T n > T m in Fig.
4) and leads to a more ecient production structure if c > 0 and a technology transfer is
possible. Similar to the analysis in Subsection 3.2, a higher cost dierential c raises the
merger-induced welfare gain. However, V in (23) is larger than the respective values in
(21) and (22). As compared to Case I, there are gains from the technology transfer, as the
inferior Eastern production technology is replaced by the superior Western technology. In
Case II, the whole market was served by a single plant (using the Western technology), so
that two-plant production exhibits a welfare gain due to a considerable decline in overall
transport cost expenditures. Let us now turn to the national welfare eects, with the
main insights being summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 If the merger leads to a technology transfer and the use of the best-practice
technology in both production plants, the following national welfare eects can be derived.
First, if c  6=4  
p
27=4, then VW(r) > 0 for any r 2 (0;1). In contrast, if c <
6=4  
p
27=4, then there exists a critical  r2
W  1=4   4c=3 + 4c2=9, such that VW(r) >
;=;< 0 if r >;=;<  r2
W. Second, welfare in the Eastern country unambiguously increases,
if c  3(1  
p
15=16), while c < 3(1  
p
15=16) implies that there exists a critical
 r2
E  3=4 + 8c=3   4c2=9, such that VE(r) >;=;< 0, if  r2
E >;=;< r.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 3 conrms our previous insight that a technology transfer provides an addi-
tional source of welfare gain. As the positive eect of a technology transfer increases with
the cost dierential c, it is intuitive that even very small countries can benet from a
merger if c is suciently large.
Let us now turn to the trade pattern eects. Similar to Subsection 3.1, we can identify
r = 1=4 and r = 3=4 (> bn
i ) as two critical levels of r for a trade-reversing eect of a
16See the Appendix for a detailed derivation of (23).
20merger. If r < 1=4, the Western country exports the consumption good in the pre-
merger equilibrium, while it loses its local production facility and, therefore, becomes
an importer in the post-merger equilibrium. In analogy, if r > 3=4 the Eastern economy
loses its local production facility and becomes an importer of the consumption good in the
post-merger equilibrium (although it was an exporter in the pre-merger equilibrium). The
trade reversal in these two cases arises due to an adjustment in rm location. However,
similar to the analysis in Subsection 3.2 (Case I), there is a third parameter range, where a
trade reversal occurs. If r 2 (1=2;bn
i ), the Western country exports the consumption good
in the pre-merger equilibrium, while it imports the consumption good in the post-merger
equilibrium. In this case, the trade reversal occurs due to a shift in the address of the
marginal consumer.
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Figure 4: Price location schedules in the pre- and post-merger equilibrium if a technology
transfer leads to a harmonization of production costs.
We can sum up the dierent ranges, where a trade reversal occurs and obtain R =
1=2+c=6. Interpreting R as the likelihood of a trade reversal after the merger if country
21size r is randomly drawn from the unit interval, we can conclude that this likelihood
increases with the ex ante cost dierential c and is smaller than the respective values in
Subsection 3.2. Hence, all other things equal, a technology transfer reduces the likelihood
of a trade reversal after the merger. This completes our formal analysis of Subsection 3.3,
with the main insights on welfare and trade structure eects being summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 A technology transfer reinforces the positive welfare eects of a merger,
implying that, irrespective of the prevailing size dierences, both countries are better o
after the merger, if the ex ante cost dierential and thus the gains from the technology
transfer are suciently high. The likelihood of a trade reversal is reduced as compared to
a scenario with asymmetric production costs and no technology transfer.
Proof. Proposition 4 follows from the analysis above.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper uses a spatial model  a la Hotelling to shed light on the consequences of a
cross-border merger on welfare and the trade pattern. Starting point of the analysis is the
long-run free trade equilibrium in Tharakan and Thisse (2002) with two asymmetrically
sized countries, quadratic transport costs, and two rms located at the Western and
Eastern boundaries of the Hotelling line, respectively. In this setting, we show that joint
prot maximization after the merger not only leads to an increase in mill prices but also
to a relocation of production sites towards the center of the market in order to reduce
transport cost expenditures. In addition, we also account for the possibility of an intra-
rm technology transfer. By separating these channels of inuence, the analysis provides
a detailed picture of the possible merger eects.
With respect to the welfare implications, the main insights of our analysis can be
summarized as follows. A merger raises prot income and reduces consumer surplus.
Global welfare unambiguously rises in response to a merger, and the merger-induced
22welfare gain increases in the ex ante cost dierential across rms. There are interesting
national implications, as well. Contrasting the results in this paper with the ndings in
Tharakan and Thisse (2002), we can formulate the following conclusion. In the benchmark
scenario with identical production costs, a movement from autarky to a long-run free trade
equilibrium lowers welfare in the large country and, depending on the magnitude of the
size dierence, may render the small country better or worse o. By way of contrast,
a merger unambiguously increases welfare in the large country but lowers welfare in the
small country if the size dierence is suciently pronounced. With ex ante production
cost dierences and a technology transfer after the merger, there are additional positive
welfare eects, so that both countries may benet from a merger, irrespective of the
prevailing size dierences.
Our analysis also points to the possibility of a trade reversal after the merger. Such
a trade reversal may either arise, if the smaller country loses the local production facility
after the adjustment in plant location, or it may be triggered by a change in the address
of the marginal consumer, who is indierent between purchasing from the two producers.
Neither of these two explanations for a trade reversing eect can be discussed in traditional
models of trade which lack a spatial dimension. In summary, the analysis in this paper
contributes to the more general insight that accounting for intranational adjustments
is necessary to obtain a detailed picture of how the recent wave of globalisation with
a substantial increase in the number of cross-border mergers aects trade patterns and
welfare.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider xW 2 [0;1], xE 2 [0;1] and (for the moment) c  1. In a rst step, we show
that in this case, an interior equilibrium with bi 2 (0;1) requires xW = 0 and xE = 1. For
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  4 + 3xE   xW

: (25)
According to (24) and (25), we can conclude that, for any xW  xE, @W()=@xW < 0
and @E()=@xE > 0 if c = 0. This conrms the well-known result that two producers
maximize the distance between their production sites in a linear model with quadratic
transport costs and identical production costs (see d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse,
1979).
But what happens if production costs dier? To answer this question, note that
@E()=@xE > 0 if c > 0. This implies xE = 1. Furthermore, let us hypothesize that there
exists a ~ xW 2 (0;1) that fullls @W(xW;1)=@xW = 0. From the second line of (24), we


















W >;=;< 0 () ~ xW >;=;< 1=3 (27)
follows from (24), it is obvious that ~ xW  1=3 is required for a prot maximizing location
decision on interval (0;1) { and bi(~ xW;1) 2 (0;1). From (26), we can therefore conclude
that c  1 rules out an equilibrium with xW 2 (0;1), xE = 1 and bi 2 (0;1).
Put dierently, if an interior equilibrium with bi 2 (0;1) exists, then c  1 implies
xW = 0 and xE = 1. Substituting into (6)-(10) gives p
W(0;1) = 1 + c=3, p
E(0;1) =
17Straightforward calculations give @2
W(~ xW;1)=@x2
W = c=(1 ~ xW)2 3. Substituting c = (1 ~ xW)(1+
3~ xW), according to (24), we further obtain @2
W(~ xW;1)=@x2
W = 2(3~ xW   1)=(1   ~ xW).
241 + 2c=3, b
i(0;1) = 1=2 + c=6, 
W(0;1) = (3 + c)2=18 and 
E(0;1) = (3   c)2=18.
Furthermore, noting that p(bi;0) = p(bi;1) = 5=4 + c=2 + c2=36, it is clear that condition
A > 5=4 + c=2 + c2=36 ensures full coverage in such an equilibrium.
So far, we have assumed that an equilibrium with positive demand of both producers
exists. In principle, however, it may be attractive for the technologically advanced W-
producer to deviate from xW = 0 in order to serve all consumers. Prot-maximizing





the optimal location if the Western producer serves the whole market.18 This pricing
rule establishes an upper bound for the deviation prot: D
W  c. Hence, deviation is
unattractive if 
W(0;1)  c or, equivalently, if (3 + c)2=18  c. From this condition, we
can derive an upper bound for cost dierential c, namely  c  6  
p
27, such that the
Western producer has no incentive to deviate from location xW = 0 if c   c. (Of course,
if the Western rm has no incentive to deviate from xW = 0, it is straightforward that
the Eastern rm clearly prefers xE = 1 to any other location on the unit interval.)
Collecting arguments and noting that  c < 1, we can nally conclude that under
conditions A > 5=4+c=2+c2=36, c  6 
p
27 there exists a unique interior equilibrium,











E(0;1). This completes the proof of Proposition 1. QED.
Derivation of eq. (21) and Proof of Lemma 1
Consider c 2 (0;3=4) and r 2 (0;1). Then, prot gains in the Western country (with
size r) are given by W(r) = (M  N)r = [A   17=16   c=2 + 2c2=9]r. Furthermore,
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consumer surplus changes in the Western economy can be written in the following way
CSW(r) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
B1(r) if r 2 (0;bn
i ]




i ) + B2(bm




W = 1 + c=3, pn
E = 1 + 2c=3, bn
i = 1=2 + c=6 from Proposition 1 and pm
W =
A (1=4+c=3)2, pm
E = A (1=4 c=3)2, bm
i = 1=2+2c=3 from the analysis in Subsection
3.2, this expression can be simplied to
CSW(r) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
[1   A + c=3 + r(1=4 + c=3)]r if r 2 (0;bn
i ]
[1   A + c=3 + r(1=4 + c=3)]r   [r   (1=2 + c=6)]2 if r 2 (bn
i ;bm
i ]
[3=2   A   r(1=4   c=3)]r + c=6 + 7c2=36   1=8 if r 2 (bm
i ;1)
;
where limr!1 CSW(r) = 18=16   A + c=2 + 7c2=36 determines CS in the text.




> > > > > <
> > > > > :
[ 1=16   c=6 + 2c2=9 + r(1=4 + c=3)]r if r 2 (0;bn
i ]
[ 1=16   c=6 + 2c2=9 + r(1=4 + c=3)]r   [r   (1=2 + c=6)]2 if r 2 (bn
i ;bm
i ]




To determine the role of r for the sign of VW(r), it is useful to consider the dierent
parameter domains in (28) separately. Accounting for c  3=4 and using  rW  [1=16 +
c=6 2c2=9]=(1=4+c=3), it follows from the rst line of (28) that VW(r) < 0 if r 2 (0;  rW),
while VW(r) > 0 if r 2 ( rW;bn
i ]. In a next step, we can look at interval r 2 (bn
i ;bm
i ].
26Noting that V 0
W(r) = 15=16+c=6+2c2=9 r(3=2 2c=3) > 0 holds for all r 2 [bn
i ;bm
i ],19
it follows from VW(bn
i ) = [1=16+ c=24+5c2=18](1=2+ c=6) > 0 that VW(r) > 0 holds
for any r 2 (bn
i ;bm
i ].
In a nal step, we can concentrate on interval r 2 (bm
i ;1). In this case, dierentiating
VW(r) gives V 0
W(r) = 7=16 c=2+2c2=9 r(1=2 2c=3) and V 00
W(r) < 0. Accounting
for VW(bm
i ) = 1=32+c=8+c2=12+8c3=27 > 0 and limr!1 VW(r) = 1=16+5c2=12 > 0
(which determines V in (21)), it follows that VW(r) must be positive for any r 2
(bm
i ;1]. Collecting the arguments, we can therefore conclude that VW(r) >;=;< 0 if
r >;=;<  rW.
Let us now turn to the Eastern economy. First, from the analysis above, we know
that VW(r) < 0 if r 2 (0;  rW]. Due to V = VW(r) + VE(r) > 0 (see (21)), this
implies VE(r) > 0 for any r 2 (0;  rW]. Second, noting from (28) that V 0
W(r) > 0
holds for any r 2 [ rW;bm
i ] (see our discussion above), we can safely conclude that VE(r)
is positive for any r 2 [ rW;bm
i ), if VE(bm
i ) > 0. Substituting from above, we obtain
VE(bm
i ) = V  VW(bm
i ) = 1=32 c=8+c2=3 8c3=27 > 0.20 Hence, VE(r) > 0 holds
for any r 2 [0;bm
i ) and we can focus on interval r 2 (bm
i ;1] in the subsequent analysis.
Accounting for VE(r) = V   VW(r) and substituting (21) and the third line of
(28), the welfare change in the Eastern country can be written in the following way
VE(r) = [3=16   c=6 + 2c
2=9   r(1=4   c=3)](1   r); (29)
if r 2 [bm
i ;1]. We can now dene (r)  3=16   c=6 + 2c2=9   r(1=4   c=3), with
(1   r) = VE(r), according to (29) and 0(r) < 0. Furthermore, while (bm
i ) > 0
follows from VE(bm
i ) > 0 (see above), the sign of (1) =  1=16+c=6+2c2=9 is not clear
19V 00
W(r) < 0 implies that V 0
W(r) > 0 holds for any r 2 [bn
i ;bm
i ] if V 0
W(bm
i ) = 3=16 c=2+2c2=3 > 0.
Noting that V 0
W(bm
i ) reaches a minimum at c = 3=8, we can therefore conclude that V 0
W(bm
i ) > 0
holds for any c 2 [0;3=4], if V 0
W(bm
i )jc=3=8 > 0. Evaluating V 0
W(bm
i ) at c = 3=8 gives 3=32 > 0, so
that the sign of V 0
W(r) in the considered interval is immediate.
20Dene (c)  1=32   c=8 + c2=3   8c3=27. Then, 0(c) =  1=8 + 2c=3   8c2=9, with 0(c) = 0 (and
00(c) = 0) if c = 3=8, while 0(c) < 0 if c 2 (0;3=8) or c 2 (3=8;3=4). Then, (0) = 1=32 and (3=4) = 0
implies that VE(bm
i ) > 0 holds for any c 2 [0;3=4).
27in general. To be more specic, we can conclude that (1) > 0 and thus VE(r) > 0 for
any r 2 (0;1) if c   3=8+
p
27=8. Otherwise (if c <  3=8+
p
27=8), we have (1) < 0,
implying that there exists a critical  rE  [3=16   c=6 + 2c2=9]=(1=4   c=3), such that
VE(r) >;=;< 0 if  rE >;=;< r. This completes the proof. QED.
Derivation of eq. (22) and Proof of Lemma 2
Consider c 2 [3=4;6 
p
27] and r 2 (0;1). Then, prot gains in the Western country (with
size r) are given by W(r) = [A   5=4   c2=9]r. Furthermore, the consumer surplus
























W = 5=4 + c=3   A, pn
E   pm
W = 5=4 + 2c=3   A and bn






[1   A + c=3 + r=2]r if r 2 (0;bn
i ]
[2 + 2c=3   A   r=2]r   (1=2 + c=6)2 if r 2 (bn
i ;1)
;
where limr!1 CSW(r) = CS = 5=4   A + c=2   c2=36 conrms the respective result
in the text. Taking into acount that VW(r) = W(r) + CSW(r), welfare changes in





[ 1=4 + c=3   c2=9 + r=2]r if r 2 (0;bn
i ]
[3=4 + 2c=3   c2=9   r=2]r   (1=2 + c=6)2 if r 2 (bn
i ;1)
: (30)
The rst line of (30) determines a critical  r1
W  1=2 2c=3+2c2=9, such that VW(r) < 0
if r 2 (0;  r1
W), while VW(r) > 0 if r 2 ( r1
W;bn
i ]. Furthermore, VW(r) increases in r
if r   r1
W. Dierentiating the second line of (30) with respect to r, gives 3=4 + 2c=3  
c2=9   r   (c), with  0(c) > 0 for any c  6  
p
27. Substituting c = 3=4, we obtain
 (3=4) = 19=16   r, which is positive for any r 2 (0;1). Hence, the second line in
(30) strictly increases in r if c 2 [3=4;6  
p
27), implying that VW(r) > 0 holds for any
28r 2 (bn
i ;1), because VW(bn
i ) > 0 (see above). Overall, this implies that VW(r) >;=;< 0
if r >;=;<  r1
W. Finally, limr!1 VW(r) gives V in (22).
Let us now turn to the welfare eects in the Eastern economy. They are determined
by VE(r) = V   VW(r). Hence, it follows from the analysis above that VE(r) >
V > 0 if r <  r1
W. Furthermore, VE(r) is decreasing in r if r   r1
W, implying that
VE(r) reaches a minimum when r approaches 1. Noting limr!1 VE(r) = 0, we can
conclude that VE(r) > 0 holds for any r 2 (0;1). This completes the proof. QED.
Derivation of eq. (23) and Proof of Lemma 3
Consider r 2 (0;1). Then, Prot gains in the Western economy equal W(r) = [A  
17=16   c2=9]r and consumer surplus changes are given by
CSW(r) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
B4(r) if r 2 (0;1=2]
B4(r) + B5(r) if r 2 (1=2;bn
i ]
B4(bn
i ) + B5(bn



















E + (b   1=4)










E + (1   b)
2   (b   3=4)
2]db:
Substituting pn
W = 1 + c=3, pn
E = 1 + 2c=3 and bn
i = 1=2 + c=6, according to Proposition
1, as well as pm
W = pm
E = A   1=16 from our analysis in Subsection 3.3, we obtain
CSW(r) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
[1 + c=3   A + r=4]r if r 2 (0;1=2]
[1=2 + c=3   A + (3=4)r]r + 1=8 if r 2 (1=2;bn
i ]
[3=2 + 2c=3   A   r=4]r   1=8   c=6   c2=36 if r 2 (bn
i ;1)
; (31)
where limr!1 CSW(r) = 18=16   A + c=2   c2=36 gives CS in the text.
29Noting VW(r) = W(r)+CSW(r), we can further conclude that welfare changes
in the Western economy are given by
VW(r) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
[ 1=16 + c=3   c2=9 + r=4]r if r 2 (0;1=2]
[ 9=16 + c=3   c2=9 + (3=4)r]r + 1=8 if r 2 (1=2;bn
i ]
[7=16 + 2c=3   c2=9   r=4]r   1=8   c=6   c2=36 if r 2 (bn
i ;1)
(32)
To determine the sign of VW(r) let us rst consider interval (0;1=2]. Then, it follows from
the rst line of eq. (32) that c  6=4 
p
27=4 ensures a positive value of VW(r) for any
r 2 (0;1=2]. However, if c < 6=4 
p
27=4 there exists a critical  r2
W  1=4 4c=3+4c2=9,
such that VW(r) < 0 if r 2 (0;  r2
W) and VW(r) > 0 if r 2 ( r2
W;1=2]. Furthermore,
noting from the second line of (32) that VW(r) increases in r if r 2 (1=2;bn
i ], it is clear
that VW(r) > 0 also extends to this case.
Finally, dierentiating the third line of in (32) with respect to r, gives V 0
W(r) =
7=16 + 2c=3   c2=9   r=2 and V 00
W(r) < 0. Hence, noting VW(bn
i ) > 0 from above and
limr!1 VW(r) = 1=16+c=2 5c2=36 > 0 (which determines V in (23)) it is immediate
that VW(r) > 0 if r 2 (bn
i ;1). Putting together, we can conclude that VW(r) > 0 for
any r 2 (0;1) if c  6=4  
p
27=4, while c < 6=4  
p
27=4 implies that VW(r) >;=;< 0
if r >;=;<  r2
W.
Let us now turn to the Eastern economy and consider VE(r) = V   VW(r).
Then, noting that VW(r) reaches a maximum on interval r 2 (0;bn
i ] if r approaches
bn
i , it is immediate that VE(r) must be positive for any r 2 (0;bn
i ] if VE(bn
i ) > 0.
Subtracting the second line of (32) from (23) and evaluating the respective expression
at r = bn
i , we obtain VE(bn
i ) = 1=32 + 29c=96   23c2=144 + c3=54 > 0, implying that
VE(r) > 0 must hold for any r 2 (0;bn
i ]. We can therefore focus on interval (bn
i ;1) in
the subsequent analysis. Subtracting the third line of (32) from (23) gives VE(r) =
[3=16 + 2c=3   c2=9   r=4](1   r) if r 2 (bn
i ;1). It is easy to show that VE(r) > 0 holds
for any r 2 (bn
i ;1) if c  3(1  
p
15=16). In contrast, c < 3(1  
p
15=16) implies that
there exists a critical  r2
E  3=4+8c=3 4c2=9, such that VE(r) > 0 if r 2 (bn
i ;  r2
E), while
VE(r) < 0 if r 2 ( r2
E;1). Altogether, we can therefore derive the following conclusion:
30if c  3(1 
p
15=16), then VE(r) > 0 for any r 2 (0;1); however, if c < 3(1 
p
15=16),
then VE(r) >;=;< 0 if  r2
E >;=;< r. This completes the proof. QED.
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